This paper exploits a natural experiment, the large destruction of capital in continental Europe during World War II, to characterize the transitional dynamics of an economy that begins with a capital stock below its steady state level. We use these regularities as a benchmark to discriminate among competing growth specifications. A model that combines non-separabilities in preferences with a technology that restricts the degree of substitutability between inputs outperforms the widely used AK and Ramsey-Cass-Koopmans specifications. Our results suggest that policy evaluations based in growth models that overlook nonseparabilities in preferences or impose strong restrictions on the technological structure might be grossly misleading.
Introduction.
Exogenous shocks provide an interesting environment for the evaluation of competing economic hypotheses. Wars and natural disasters, with their associated destructions of capital, imply an unambiguous deviation from the equilibrium growth path. This paper exploits the adjustment of Western European economies after World War II as a tool to discriminate among alternative specifications of preferences and technology within the growth context. Endogeneity, in non-experimental sciences, remains a crucial limitation of empirical attempts to discriminate among alternative theoretical hypotheses. In economics, long lasting controversies on the real effects of monetary policy or the short-run role of aggregate demand in the determination of income are classic examples of this problem. In the growth context, exogenous technological change drives capital accumulation and growth in neoclassical models, while the endogenous growth literature points to alternative forms of capital accumulation as the determinants of technological change and growth 1 . The difficulties in identifying exogenous shocks have shifted our attention to special historical events. Economists can learn a lot from the behavior of the economy after a war or natural disaster, since they are the closest things to controlled experiments.
Most macroeconomics textbooks illustrate the transitional dynamics of the neoclassical model relying in the post-World War II growth record of Western Europe or Japan. Nevertheless, we still miss a more comprehensive analysis of the reconstruction process, not only in terms of its outstanding growth record, but also devoting attention to the behavior of other economic indicators.
The performance of these variables might provide valuable information to contrast competing growth theories. We attempt to fill this gap by comparing the adjustment process after the war with the transitional dynamics generated by a variety of growth specifications.
In the spirit of Kaldor (1961) , our preliminary goal is to identify some empirical regularities that characterize the transition of an economy after a large destruction of capital. We find that the European post-war experience was characterized by high and slowly decreasing growth rates, nonmonotonic adjustment of the saving rate, and a smoothly increasing capital-output ratio and wage share. Then, we develop a flexible model that is parameterized to reproduce some of the most popular specifications found in the growth literature. We use the stylized facts of the reconstruction process as a benchmark to compare the performance of our alternative parameterizations.
This analysis of the transitional dynamics proves to be a promising avenue for the evaluation of competing growth specifications. This issue has become one of increasing relevance given the widespread use of growth models as the standard tool for the analysis of a large variety of problems involving intertemporal tradeoffs 2 and the sensitivity of the results of these studies to the underlying of growth structure.
Our main findings suggest that non-separabilities in preferences and deviations from the restrictive Cobb-Douglas technology seem to be essential to reconcile the model predictions with the data. And therefore policy evaluations derived under growth specifications that overlook these issues should be regarded with caution. For instance, Alvarez-Cuadrado et al. (2004) report welfare gains from a permanent increase in the rate of technological change under time non-separable preferences being 40% larger than the conventional estimates derived with time-separable specifications.
From the outset it is worth clarifying that our goal is not to present a model that provides a full account of the events that took place in post-war Europe, but rather to take advantage of this historical event to refine our understanding of some desirable features of preferences and technology within a growing economy. Other authors have focused on the consequences of the World War II. Christiano (1989) conducts an analysis similar to ours in an attempt to understand the nature of the increase in the Japanese saving rate that took place during the seventies. Gilchrist and Williams (2001) consider an interpretation of Japan and Germany's post-war growth that relies in technological change embodied in new vintages of capital.
We complete our analysis revisiting some of the alternative explanations for the outstanding economic record in post-war continental Europe proposed in the literature, specifically: The
Marshall plan and the provision of public infrastructure, the expansion of international trade and the structural transformation of an agricultural economy. This exercise confirms the importance of the large destruction of capital as a main determinant of the post-war economic record.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 documents the post-war gap and characterizes some key features of the adjustment process. In sections 3 and 4 we set up a flexible model that could be parameterized to reproduce some of the most popular growth specifications and we characterize its macroeconomic behavior. Section 5 conducts a numerical analysis contrasting the performance of several model specifications with the empirical regularities of the reconstruction 2 Over the last decades growth models have become a standard tool for the analysis, not only of long-run issues for which they were originally designed, but also to address a wide variety of problems. For instance, Gourinchas and Jeanne (2003) use a calibrated neoclassical model to measure the welfare gains from financial integration, Turnovsky and Chatterjee (2002) calibrate a non-scale growth model to conduct a numerical analysis of the alternative uses for the U.S. budget surplus projected for the end of Clinton's administration, and Ireland (1994) , using an "AK" growth model, explores whether a permanent tax cut can improve the long run government budget balance.
process. Section 6 evaluates alternative hypotheses for the post-war European performance and the conclusions are summarized in Section 7.
2. Europe after the war: Some stylized facts of the reconstruction process.
World War II left a track of devastation in continental Europe. During the war years, the productive efforts of more than an entire generation were lost with per capita income returning to the levels of the turn of the century. As a result, the post-war European situation provides a rare natural experiment for an economy that starts out with a capital stock well below its equilibrium level.
Three causes contributed to the low level of physical capital in post-war Europe. First, as Crafts and Toniolo (1996) point out, Europe as a consequence of the Great Depression experienced a slowdown in the process of accumulation of physical capital not being matched by an equal deceleration of human capital formation 3 . Second, during the war the depletion rate of the two kinds of capital was strongly biased against physical assets, Table 1 and 2 summarize evidence on the devastating effects of the war. In our sample of economies most directly affected by the conflict (France, Germany, Italy, Austria and the Netherlands) the war destroyed between one third and one quarter of the pre-war capacity, while the cost of the war in human lives is substantially lower. And third, as we will later argue, technological change didn't stop during the conflict, and therefore conventional quantifications of the post-war gap tend to understate it 4 .
Next we turn to assess the estimated length of the reconstruction period. At first glance it seems sensible to assume that this period ends when output recovers the pre-war level. Nevertheless, Janossy (1971) argues that the reconstruction period lasts more, ending only at the time when the actual level of production equals the level that would have been reached at that point if the war never occurred. In a sense this proposition assumes that the rate of technological change relevant for these European economies kept increasing during the conflict. This hypothesis is consistent with some recent results of the extensive research program on the time series properties of output, initiated by 3 Along these lines, Milward (1984) claims that Europe was reconstructed, not only from the destructive consequences of the war, but also from the economic collapse of 1929-32. "Thus the increase in inputs of education and technology into most Western European economies did not diminish over that time so that if the barriers to grow were lifted a surge of growth would be automatically produced" (pg. 463) 4 Recent models that link technological change to the production of ideas are consistent with this hypothesis. Endogenous models that rely in learning-by-doing mechanisms or capital accumulation are more difficult to reconcile with this argument. Saint-Paul (1993) claims "entrepreneurial behavior, the drive for innovation, and all the institutional infrastructure that make a market economy work where here (in France) after the war" (pg. 110-111). Boltho (1982) argues that "turning to technical progress, it is possible that this may also have accelerated after 1945 in view of the investment backlog accumulated during the recession and the war… This abundant supply of technology (developed in the US) increased the steady state gap" (pg. 12). Nelson and Plosser (1982) . Ben-David et al. (2003) use 120 years of OCED data to extend this analysis allowing for two endogenously determined structural breaks. Their preferred specification, two structural breaks allowing for changes in the slope and the intercept, rejects the unit root null hypothesis in favor of the trend stationary alternative for most of their sample. Their results suggest that the economies affected by a large destruction of capital as a consequence of the conflict had a first break during the war years and a second one in the late 60's. Since pre-war levels were recovered early in the 50's, this second break can be interpreted as the end of the reconstruction period, in line with Janossy's argument. Furthermore, economies not affected by the war have both structural breaks before the Great Depression 5 , and therefore we find this evidence compelling of our claim that the control group (U.S., Australia and Canada) grew along the stable path during the two decades that followed the war. An alternative approach to assess the length of the reconstruction process draws on the extensive literature on convergence. Islam (1995) and Caselli et al. (1997) allow for country-specific effects to address some of the problems that plagued the first attempts to measure the speed of convergence. Their estimates, in the range of 9%, imply that it will take around 16 years to close 75% of the gap caused by the war. As a result, we are confident that the recovery from World War II was characterized by long lasting dynamics and therefore we extend the scope of our analysis until 1970. Table 3 and Figure 1 illustrate the evolution of the growth rate, capital-output ratio, saving rate and labor income share from 1950 to 1970 for our sample of economies. In order to identify the stylized facts of the reconstruction process we reproduce the evolution of those same variables for other OECD economies that were not directly affected by the conflict that we use as a control group in our natural experiment 6 . We identify the following stylized facts characterizing the transitional dynamics of an economy after a large destruction of physical capital:
-Stylized fact 1. The adjustment process is characterized by high and slowly decreasing growth rates (this convergence does not need to be monotonic). Papageogiou and PerezSebastian (2002) report a similar pattern for the growth rates of South Korea and Japan.
-Stylized fact 2. Between 1955 and 1970 the capital-output ratio smoothly increases 7 .
5 The US has the second structural break in 1955, possibly reflecting the end of the abnormally high level of production during the Korean War. 6 See Alvarez-Cuadrado (2004a) on the robustness of the control group to the inclusion of other OECD countries. 7 Hayashi (1989) finds a similar pattern in the Japanese post-war wealth-income ratio and he argues that measurement errors in the early fifties' data might be behind this behavior. As we argue in Appendix I, we believe that King and Levine (1994) estimates overstate the true capital-output ratio in the beginning of the sample. Maddison (1994) provides evidence consistent with this claim, and therefore we choose to ignore the early observations of this ratio.
-Stylized fact 3. The saving rate exhibits a characteristic inverted u-shape. During the first years monotonically increases reaching its maximum after more than a decade, thereafter slowly decreases. Christiano (1989) and Hayashi (1989) report similar evidence for the Japanese post-war period. Chari et al. (1996) reports similar saving patterns for South Korea.
-Stylized fact 4. The wage share exhibits an upward trend, increasing on average above 12% in the period considered.
At first glance, stylized facts 1 and 2 provide interesting information about the underlying production structure. The progressive decrease (increase) of the growth rate (capital-output ratio)
seems to point to some degree of diminishing returns at work. Stylized fact 4 might contribute to further refinements on the production structure; variations in the inputs shares suggest deviations from the conventional Cobb-Douglas specification and its unitary elasticity of substitution between inputs. Finally, stylized fact 4 points to preferences specifications characterized by some degree of temporal dependence in consumption. As Alvarez-Cuadrado et al. (2004) highlight, differences in the adjustment paths between time separable and time non-separable economies depend crucially in the nature of the shock analyzed. Their results suggest that shocks that lead to sudden decreases in consumption, such as a large destruction of capital 8 , are an ideal environment to bring to light these differences.
The model
Consider a closed economy 9 populated by identical and infinitely lived households that grows at the exogenous rate, N N N n . The individual household's objective is to maximize the intertemporal utility function:
Where 0 β > is the individual discount rate. Instantaneous utility is defined over absolute consumption, , and relative consumption,
where agents compare their own consumption 8 As Wolf (1993) reports the food rations in Germany between 1945-47 fell to half of the pre-war level. 9 Under the strict capital controls of the early Bretton Woods agreement the closed economy assumption seems a sensible one. The restoration of current account convertibility did not occur until 1959 in Europe, and the agreement allowed controls on capital account transactions for an indefinite period. In this line, Saint-Paul (1993) characterizes the French economy as "exchange controls prevailed, imports were severely restricted, the market for foreign exchange was severely regulated and segmented with a complicated system of multiple exchange rates." (pg. 15) Therefore a close economy that equates domestic saving to investment does not seem as an unrealistic assumption.
with a measure of the past economy-wide average level of consumption,
. We impose nonsatiation in utility, restricting i to lie in the range 0 1. If , (1) reduces to the conventional specification in which preferences are time independent and therefore only the absolute level of consumption matters. As γ → 1, only relative consumption matters and the absolute level of consumption becomes irrelevant. In general, σ and γ interact to determine the intertemporal elasticity of substitution.
We model as a declining weighted average of past consumption of a reference group.
Since agents are atomistic, when deciding over current consumption, they ignore the effects of this decision on the future evolution of the reference stock, taking it as exogenous. Therefore under this "catching up with the Joneses" specification the reference stock is determined by, 
With the speed of adjustment, ρ, measuring the relative importance of recent consumption in the determination of the reference stock.
An alternative approach commonly referred as "habit formation" assumes that the reference stock is an average of the agent's own past consumption. Under this assumption, a forward-looking agent fully internalizes the effects of her current consumption decision in the future evolution of the reference stock. This approach requires the introduction of a second co-state variable leading to a higher order dynamical system despite of the fact that under exogenously supplied labor the behavior of both specifications is very similar. For these reasons, we restrict our analysis to the external evolution of the reference stock, although our results are easily extended to a habit-forming environment.
Finally, our preferences differ from those in Christiano (1989) that introduces an exogenously determined subsistence level of consumption. His specification has several theoretical problems, apart from the arbitrary determination of the subsistence level. The most important one being that for plausible parameterizations of the subsistence level, the low post-war consumption might lead to a negative argument in the utility function.
Individual 's output is produced combining her private capital stock, , and the level of inelastically supplied labor, . Assuming that the exogenous rate of technological change,
Harrod neutral, a natural benchmark since this assumption is necessary for the existence of a balanced growth path, individual output is determined according to the following CES production function,
Where α , might reflect any institutional factors that affect the level of output, µ determines the functional distribution of income, and ( )
is the elasticity of substitution between capital and augmented labor.
Final output can be either consumed, yielding immediate satisfaction, or saved. Assuming that the existing capital stock depreciates at a rate, δ , household i 's capital stock evolves according to the following law of motion,
The combination of a flexible preference specification, (1), and a general production structure, (2), allows us to parameterize a wide variety of models extensively used in the growth literature.
Macroeconomic equilibrium.
The representative agent makes her consumption-saving decision to maximize (1) subject to (5) with the evolution of the reference stock taken as given. With i λ being the co-state variable associated with the capital stock, the first order conditions for an optimum are ( )
together with the transversality conditions
The interpretations of (6a) and (6b) are standard; (10a) equates the utility of an additional unit of consumption, which depends on the reference stock, to the shadow value of capital and (6b) is an intertemporal allocation condition equating the marginal product of capital to the rate of return on consumption.
Taking the time derivative of (6a), combining the result with (6b) and (3) and imposing the
, we can obtain the equilibrium path for individual consumption.
Summing across households,
which describes the evolution for the growth rate of aggregate consumption as a function of the capital and reference stocks.
We define a balanced growth path as being one along which all variables grow at a constant 
Where , output per unit of effective labor, is a function of and other technological parameters of the model. Note that if either y k , so that the reference stock is irrelevant to utility, or , so that the reference stock is fixed, (8a) and (8b) collapse to the system of equations that describes the dynamics under the familiar time-separable utility specification.
Imposing the steady state condition, 0 c k h = = = , we can solve for the steady state values of capital, consumption, and habit as follows,
In the absence of technological change, 0 x = , (9c) implies 
Numerical analysis
We parameterize our model to reproduce some of the specifications encountered in the growth literature, specifically 10 ; Ramsey-Cass-Koopmans (RCK) where preferences are time separable and technology is Cobb-Douglas, Carroll-Overland-Weil (COW) where preferences are time non-separable and technology exhibits constant returns to capital, Alvarez-Monteiro-Turnovsky (AMT) where preferences are time non-separable and technology is Cobb-Douglas and finally our own specification (Ours) that combines time non-separable preferences with CES technology.
Equilibrium values under alternative parameterizations.
The resulting specifications are calibrated to reproduce some of the key features of actual economies. Table 4 In the economies with neoclassical technology (RCK, AMT and Ours) α is normalized to 1, the distribution parameter, µ , is set to match an equilibrium capital share of 0.4, the parameter that governs the intertemporal substitutability of consumption, σ , is chosen to match an equilibrium saving rate equal to 0.26, the rate of population growth is set to 0.015 and the rate of exogenous technological change, , is consistent with the average growth rate of our sample economies over the last century 0.02 x = 11 . In the COW economy, we use α to reproduce a 2% equilibrium growth rate, while σ is set equal to 2.5, consistent with the estimates reported by Ogaki and Reinhart (1998) . In the time-non-separable specifications (COW, AMT and Ours) the parameter that controls the importance of the reference stock, γ , is set to 0.9 within the range of estimates provided by Fuhrer (2000) . There is little empirical evidence on the magnitude of the speed of adjustment of the reference stock, ρ . Carroll (2000) calibrates a similar model to reproduce the increase in the Japanese saving rate during the seventies, for this purpose he chooses a very slow speed of adjustment. Along these lines, we set ρ equal to 0.35 that implies a half-life of the adjustment of the reference stock to a permanent change in consumption close to 2 years 12 .
The final parametric choice is for the elasticity parameter in the CES technology, b . We set the elasticity of substitution between inputs to 0.7, the mid-point of the range of estimates reported by Antras (2004) after allowing for biased technological change 13 . Table 5 presents the equilibrium for the four economies. As a result of our parameterization all models display an equilibrium growth rate of 2%. The models with neoclassical technology yield an output-capital ratio of 0.32, a savings rate of 0.26, a rate of return of capital close to 8% and a capital share of 0.4, all of them in line with the empirical evidence on OCDE economies. As expected, the savings rate (output-capital ratio) is substantially higher (lower) in the model that exhibits constant returns to capital, in empirical grounds we can rationalize these values attending to a broad definition of capital. Finally, the speeds of convergence implied by all of our specifications are consistent with the estimates reported by Islam (1995) and Caselli et al. (1997) .
Dynamic response after a large destruction of capital.
In order to contrast the performance of these four specifications with the empirical evidence from the European reconstruction process, we consider the adjustment paths in response to a 50% destruction of capital 14 .
It is worth noticing that the adjustment of this class of models is driven by the interaction of two forces; the "rate of return effect" and the "status effect". When capital is below its equilibrium level, its rate of return is high, and therefore the relative price of current relative to future consumption is high and the present value of human wealth is low. These factors contribute to the "rate of return effect" that reduces consumption increasing savings. On the other hand, the presence of a reference stock is behind the "status effect" that constraints the deviations of individual consumption from the predetermined level of consumption of the reference group.
A 50% destruction of capital leads to an immediate decrease in output under any specification. In the RCK economy output decreases by 24%, and with only the "rate of return effect" at work, consumption absorbs the impact of the shock, decreasing by 34%. This large decrease in consumption leads to a 38% increase in the saving rate. This high level of investment combined with the high average productivity of capital leads to a monotonic adjustment path along which capital, output and consumption grow together, gradually restoring their pre-shock levels. The growth and saving rates reach their maxima immediately after the shock converging monotonically towards their intertemporal equilibrium levels.
In the COW economy with capital being the only input of production, its initial destruction is translated into a proportional decrease in output. Since the aggregate technology exhibits constant 14 Following King and Rebelo (1993) our approach tackles the original non-linear problem exploiting the transversality condition to pin down the initial value of the control variable. The resulting initial value problem is easily solved using conventional methods for systems of ODE's. In addition, Judd (1992) and Santos (2000) , suggest the use of the Euler equation residuals to evaluate the accuracy of our numerical solutions. This residual, that under the true solution is zero, can be interpreted as the one-period optimization error as a fraction of current consumption. For any of our specifications the maximum error is below 0.36%, with the average error over the twenty years considered being always below 0.2%. These errors rise above 6% and 1% respectively if a linear approximation method is used. See Alvarez-Cuadrado (2004a) for a complete discussion of this methodology and an estimation of the 50% gap.
returns to capital, its marginal product is constant, and therefore the saving-consumption decision is fully driven by the agents' unwillingness to reduce consumption below her standard of living, determined by their pre-shock reference stock. Under these circumstances the shock is mainly absorbed by a 24% reduction in savings. As the reference stock adjusts, the saving rate increases converging to its intertemporal equilibrium value from below. The unsustainably high level of consumption leads to a transition characterized by below-equilibrium levels of growth and capital accumulation.
In the economies that combine time non-separable preferences with diminishing returns (AMT and Ours) the initial destruction of capital leads to a 24%-26% decrease in output, depending on the degree of substitutability implied by the production technology. The presence of the reference stock inhibits the initial decline in consumption, which only falls by 22%-25%, leading to an immediate decrease in the saving rate. Nonetheless the high marginal product of capital associated with the lower capital stock leads to a transition characterized by substantial growth. With output growing and consumption tied to the past by the "status effect", savings increases faster than does output so that the saving rate begins to rise, reaching its peak after a decade. Thereafter, as capital accumulates, its marginal product decreases, and consequently the saving rate declines, doing so monotonically until equilibrium is restored.
The most relevant difference between the two time non-separable economies arises from the adjustment of the factor shares. Under Cobb-Douglas technology, a 50% destruction of capital leads to an exactly offsetting increase in its rate of return, and consequently constant factor shares characterize the adjustment of the AMT economy. On the other hand the initial factor imbalance generates a more than proportional increase in the return to capital under the restrictions imposed by our CES parameterization leading to more than a 10% decrease in the wage share. Along the transition as capital accumulates, its rate of return decreases and the wage share recovers asymptotically its equilibrium value. Figure 2 compares the time series generated by our alternative specifications with the stylized facts of the European reconstruction process. The predictions of the COW model are largely at conflict with the patterns observed in the data. The assumption on the returns to capital leads to a transition characterized by low growth, low savings and a constant capital-output ratio, therefore we should focus on the specifications that introduce diminishing returns to capital 15 . Under neoclassical technology, the behavior of the growth rate and the capital-output ratio is qualitatively consistent with the patterns of the data. As in post-WWII Europe, the destruction of capital leads to a transition characterized by high and slowly decreasing growth and increasing capital-output ratio. The humpshaped behavior of the saving rate (stylized fact 3) and the non-monotonic convergence of the growth rate, frequently reported by development economists, are easily reproduced by models that introduce non-separabilities in preferences. On the other hand under the RCK specification the saving rate reaches its maximum right after the shock and thereafter it decreases monotonically 16 . To further discriminate between the time non-separable specifications we need to turn to the evolution of the wage share. The post-war evolution of the factor shares is easily reproduced by our CES specification. If the elasticity of substitution between inputs is below unity, the initial factor imbalance leads to a more than proportional increase in the price of the scarce resource, capital. As a result, an increasing labor share characterizes the adjustment of the economy with CES technology. Table 7 compares the time derivatives of the series generated under each specification with those of the post-war data, the results of this comparison are consistent with our previous discussion.
Therefore we conclude that evidence from the reconstruction process suggests the importance of growth specifications that combine time non-separable preferences with flexible technologies that allow departures from unitary elasticity of substitution imposed by the CobbDouglas specification. These results have far reaching implications. In theoretical grounds, policy evaluations that overlook non-separabilities in preferences or impose strong restrictions on the technological structure might be grossly misleading. In empirical grounds, Hsieh (1998) shows that if the elasticity of substitution between inputs is below one and technical change is not neutral (Hicks-neutral), standard growth accounting exercises tend to understate the true contribution of technological change.
Finally, King and Rebelo (1993) highlights the counterfactual implications for the real interest rate of technologies that exhibit strong diminishing returns to capital. Assuming that the after-war U.S. and Japanese economy shared a common steady state level of capital, their calculations show that the Japanese real interest rate implied by a neoclassical technology would have been over 500 percent in 1950. In this context, it seems relevant to evaluate the implications for the marginal product of capital of our preferred specification. After the shock the rate of return to capital peaks around 22% then it monotonically decreases reaching 16% after a decade. Saint-Paul (1993) estimates the gross return to capital for France. He reports an estimate of 25% for 1949 and 15% for 1959, in line with the predictions of our model.
Alternative hypotheses on the post-WWII European growth experience.
The literature has identified several explanations for the European post-war record. These explanations discount the importance of the destruction of capital as a determinant of the subsequent growth performance. Along these lines, it might be possible to rationalize the stylized facts of the post-war period on the basis of these explanations, without the need to abandon the conventional time-separable assumption in preferences or to depart from the familiar Cobb-Douglas technology.
In this section we present fully specified models that provide the basis for the quantification of these additional forces behind the post-war European record. On one hand this exercise strengthens our confidence in the relevance of the "reconstruction hypothesis" as first introduced by Christiano (1988) , on the other hand our analysis complements our previous results quantifying the relative importance of some of the additional forces behind the post-war European record.
Large migration from agriculture to the manufacturing sector.
Several authors point to the substantial reallocation of resources from agricultural to nonagricultural activities that took place in post-war Europe as one of the key factors behind the outstanding growth record of this period 17 . The destructive impact of the war, breaking all sorts of preexisting ties, might have contributed to some degree to this intense reallocation of the labor force.
For instance in Italy the share of population devoted to agriculture decreased from 40% in 1950 to 18% in 1970. Figure 3 summarizes the evolution of the share of the labor force devoted to agriculture for our sample economies and the control group. In post-war Europe almost 17% of the population migrated from agriculture to manufactures, while this figure is below 8% in our control group.
Assuming that the productivity of labor and capital intensity are higher in industry than in agriculture 18 , large migrations from rural to industrial areas might lead to substantial increases in output, capital-output ratio and wage share, consistent with our stylized facts. Particularly we are interested in whether this migration process is able to account for the substantial increase in the 17 See Alvarez-Cuadrado (2004b) for a brief survey of this literature. 18 Gollin et al. (2002) report that output per worker in non-agriculture is substantially higher than in agriculture.
income share of labor (stylized fact 4), without the need to make further assumptions about the production technology. In order to explore this hypothesis, we borrow the model from Gollin et al.
(2002).
They extend a one-sector neoclassical growth model to include an explicit agricultural sector.
Their economy is populated by an infinitely-lived representative agent that derives satisfaction from the consumption of a non-agricultural good and a non-storable agricultural good. Utility derived from the agricultural good is linear but subject to satiation. Under this assumption, labor will be allocated entirely to the agricultural sector until the level of satiation, A , is reached. Once this level is achieved labor begins to migrate to the manufacturing sector. Agricultural output is produced using labor and land, while the non-agricultural technology combines labor and capital. Both technologies are Cobb-Douglas. The agricultural good can only be used for consumption, whereas the non-agricultural good can also be invested increasing the available capital stock. Technological change is assumed to be exogenous and can vary between sectors 19 .
We calibrate the model to reproduce some of the key features of the post-war economies.
Specifically, the rate of technological change in agriculture, a γ , is set so that the model tracks the Jorgeson and Gollop (1992) estimate that productivity growth has been high in agriculture relative to service and manufacture sectors, this is consistent with our calibrations of both rates of technological change.
storable commodities are manufactures, the progressive migration of labor between sectors leads to a transition characterized by a monotonically increasing saving rate, S Y , as opposed to the nonmonotonic behavior that characterized post-war saving adjustment. This increase in investment combined with the diminishing returns to capital exhibited by our Cobb-Douglas technology lead to a smoothly increasing capital-output ratio, K Y , qualitatively similar to the path observed in the data. Finally, our calibrated model, although qualitatively predicts the evolution of the labor share in income, is not able to capture the extent of this process. In order to maximize the explanatory power of our model on this issue, we reduce the labor share parameter in the agriculture production function down to .05, well below any relevant empirical evidence. Even under this extreme assumption, our model is only able to generate 60% of the increase in the wage share observed in the post war data.
As a result, we conclude that the post-war evolution of the labor share can hardly be explained in terms of the reallocation of labor from a traditional agricultural sector to manufactures, and therefore we might need to abandon the familiar Cobb-Douglas world, with its unitary elasticity of substitution between factors, in favor of a more flexible production structure to be able to account for this pattern.
The Marshall Plan and the role of government productive expenditure.
Several authors have highlighted the important role played by the combination of foreign aid and the public provision of infrastructures in post-war Europe as a determinant factor behind the outstanding growth record 21 . The Marshall Plan that accounted for 2.5% of the GDP of the recipient economies for a period of 4 years, from 1948 to 1951, was mainly directed towards public enterprises. As we can see in Figure 5 , the behavior of non-military government expenditure as a percentage of GDP exhibits important differences between our sample and control groups. In Europe, non-military government expenditure as a share of GDP begins close to its two-decade maximum of 15%, thereafter it falls during the fifties reaching 13% by the early sixties and remaining around this value for the rest of the reconstruction period. In the other hand, this variable exhibits a clear upward trend in our control group.
Given the empirical relevance of this hypothesis, we develop a model that allows us to explore the joint effects of productive government expenditure and foreign aid in post-war Europe. 21 De Long and Eichegreen (1993) provide a review of this literature.
Particularly we are interested in whether increases in the marginal product of private capital, as a consequence the rapid increases in public infrastructure, combined with the increased availability of resources for private use, can provide a rationalization for the hump-shaped behavior of the saving rate (stylized fact 3).
We consider an economy populated by an infinitely lived household whose welfare is defined over consumption streams. The representative firm produces output,Y , combining private and public capital, with a production technology that exhibits decreasing returns to scale in the private factor, and constant returns to scale in both factors. We calibrate our model to reproduce some of the key features of the post-war period.
Specifically we target the path of non-military government expenditure during those two decades. the level of infrastructures and second, the lower tax rate increases the resources available for private use. Both effects lead to a transition characterized by an output growth rate slightly above the equilibrium rate.
Since we are particularly interested in the ability of our model to replicate the non-monotonic adjustment of the saving rate observed in post-war Europe, the last panels of Figure 6 reproduce the behavior of private and total investment (that in a close economy is equal to saving). Initially private investment is crowded-out by the high rate of public investment, but along the transition private investment increases monotonically. The adjustment of the saving rate, which is the combination of private and public investment, is qualitatively consistent with the hump-shaped pattern observed in the data, but in quantitative terms is two orders of magnitude smaller than its empirical counterpart.
To quantify the effects of the Marshall Plan we introduce a temporary transfer representing 2.5% of Our quantitative results suggest that the overall effects of aid and investment in infrastructures are not large enough to represent a significant stimulus. Furthermore, we can conclude from our analysis that the observed behavior of saving is difficult to reproduce relying in this class of production technologies.
The role of international trade
Several studies 24 highlight the role played by international trade in the post-war European experience. Figure 7 illustrates the evolution of the degree of openness -the sum of exports plus imports, measured as a share of national product-of our sample economies and control group. The 23 Eichengreen and Uzan (1991) calculate that 35% of aid went into investment. We choose the value of ξ combining this estimate with the equilibrium private to public capital ratio. 24 Milward (1984) , Boltho (1982) .
40% increase in this measure, from 27.5% in 1950 to 40% in 1970, seems consistent with a primary role of trade in the post-war European experience.
Nonetheless, a careful analysis of the individual country experiences uncovers divergent patterns, while Germany and Austria experienced important increases in this measure, in France and the Netherlands these increases are insignificant and in some cases smaller than the average increase in openness in our control group. Therefore, given the distinct growth performance of our sample and control group, it seems difficult to justify why the effects of trade are so strongly felt by western European economies and not by other OECD countries that also experienced substantial increases in trade.
Furthermore, analyzing the time pattern of our measure of openness, we observe the most dramatic increases taking place towards the end of the reconstruction period and well beyond it into the 70's, coinciding with the productivity slowdown. For this reason we further reduce our confidence in trade as the main engine behind the fast growth experienced during the reconstruction period.
Finally, Frankel and Romer (1999) , provide strong evidence on the causal relation from trade to income by identifying the geographical component of trade. They estimate that a rise of one percentage point in the ratio of trade to GDP increases income per capita by one-half percent.
Following closely De Long (1997), Table 8 reports calculations based on this estimate. On average the increase in trade explains less than half a percentage point of growth during the reconstruction period.
Therefore we can conclude that the "stylized facts" of the reconstruction process are difficult to rationalize in terms of the usual suspects: Large migrations from agriculture to manufactures, the Marshall Plan and public investment, and international trade. Even though this exercise does not provide direct evidence on the relevance of our specification (time non-separable preferences and CES technology) it strengthens our confidence in the previous analysis that identifies the large destruction of capital caused by the war as the main determinant behind the post-war economic record.
Conclusions
This paper compares the adjustment of European economies after World War II with the time series generated by several growth models after a shock that halves the stock of physical capital.
This analysis of the transitional dynamics is a powerful tool to discriminate among competing theoretical specifications that share similar steady state predictions.
Our results suggest that the introduction of non-separabilities in preferences and technologies that depart from the unitary elasticity of substitution implied by the Cobb-Douglas production function improve substantially the ability of the model to reproduce the adjustment observed after a large destruction of capital. Our confidence in this result is indirectly confirmed by the evaluation of the most relevant hypotheses for the post-war growth miracle proposed in the literature.
If the economy is better described by our preferred specification, as evidence from post-war Europe suggests, macroeconomic policies developed under other assumptions are likely to be grossly misleading. For instance in the supply side, our results cast some doubts on the conclusions of the literature that explores whether a reduction in marginal tax rates can improve the long-run government budget that heavily relies on a technological structure that exhibits constant returns to capital. In the demand side, policy choices based on welfare analysis should be taken with caution.
Along these lines Alvarez-Cuadrado et al. (2004) document substantial differences in the response of welfare between economies with time separable and time non-separable preferences. In their benchmark calibration an increase in productivity leads to an increase in welfare 40% larger in an economy characterized by time non-separable preferences. In empirical grounds, Hsieh (1998) points out that conventional growth accounting exercises overstate the true contribution of factor accumulation to growth, when technological change is not neutral and the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor is below one.
Furthermore, our results provide some insight on the substantial reduction in the growth rate of output per worker that began in the late 1960s or early 1970s. In the Western European context, conventional quantifications of the productivity slowdown, that fail to account for the lasting effects of the war or the substantial reallocation of factors that characterized the post-war period, might overstate its true dimension.
Finally, the performance of our preferred model has been only contrasted in the context of the post-war European economies and, therefore, a broader analysis of this specification remains relevant. Along these lines, empirical evidence on the effects of financial liberalizations or important institutional changes can be compared with the predictions of our model. Table 3 . Some stylized facts of the transitional path after a large destruction of capital. Growth rates are in year terms. 25 "Pre-war level" is the year at which output per capita recovered the 1939 level. "Back to trend" is the year at which actual output would have equaled the level of output if the war never occurred. We estimate this level of output as the fitted value from a regression of the log of real per capital GDP on a constant and a time trend. The decrease in income is calculated using data from Maddison (1991) . The decreases in the capital stock are calculated from several sources. For Germany we use the estimates of Maddison (1994) , for France we use the estimates provided by Saint-Paul (1993) , for Netherlands we rely in Griffiths and Van Zanden (1989) , for Italy we base our estimates in data provided by DeCecco and Giavazzi (1993) , finally the evidence for Austria is more sparse, Bischof and Pelinka (1995) is our main source.
All the figures about the victims of the war are from Ellis (1993) b. Data on the adjustment process
For expositional purposes, we choose to report five-year moving averages for each country and variable. Aggregate data is calculated using real GDP Geary-Khamis PPP adjusted US$ 1990 as the aggregation weight. Data on per capita real GDP is from Maddison (2001) , data on saving rates is from Maddison (1992) , except Italy and Austria that are from Heston et al. (2000) . Data on the capital-output ratios is from King and Levine (1994) . They compute the gross capital stock based on the Perpetual Inventory Method. Their method requires an initial guess for the capital stock that they base in an estimate of the steady state capital-output ratio. Then the capital stock for 1950 is computed as the product between this estimate of the capital-output ratio and the widely available measure of income per capita for that year. Subsequent values of the capital stock are computed adding investment and allowing for depreciation. As a consequence of the conflict, it is very possible that the steady state ratio that they use as initial condition substantially overstates the capital stock in 1950. As the weight of the initial stock in their calculation for the current capital stock declines, the estimate becomes more reliable. As a result, we believe that the initial dip in the capital-output ratio comes from the unreliable estimation of its initial value since this problem disappears as the initial stock depreciates we are confident that the data after the mid-fifties becomes a good approximation to the true capitaloutput ratio. Data on wage share is from Marquetti (2002) , and we adjust it to account for selfemployment following Gollin (2002) .
Section 6.1
Data on employment share on agriculture is from the following sources; OECD (1963 ( , 1972 ( ) and GGDC (2004 . Data on the weight of agriculture on GDP is from OECD (1969, 1973) .
Section 6.2
Data on government expenditure share of GDP is from the following sources is from Heston et al. (2002) . Data on the weight of defense expenditure as share of government expenditure is from OECD (1969, 1973) Section 6. 3 We use a measure of openness in current prices from Heston et al. (2002) Appendix II A. Large migration from agriculture to the manufacturing sector. Gollin et al. (2002) 
Output from the agriculture sector can only be consumed, so the agriculture resource constraint is simply at ≤ Y . In the early stages of development all the labor force is employed in agriculture, as output per capita in the agricultural sector reaches A A , labor will migrate to the manufacturing sector. In the limit agriculture's employment share shrinks to zero and the model converges to the one-sector neoclassical model. Output from the manufacturing sector can be used for consumption or investment, and therefore the law of motion for the stock of capital, that depreciates a constant rate δ , is
Finally, the representative agent inelastically supplies a unit of labor ( 26 . The first step determines the evolution of the labor allocation across sectors. Preferences imply that labor will be allocated entirely to the agricultural sector until at Y A = . Once this critical level is reached, the labor force will migrate to the manufacture sector at the rate of technological change in agriculture. Therefore the proportion of labor force employed in manufactures grows at the rate, In line with the literature, we define a balanced growth path as being one along which all variables grow at a constant rate. With capital being accumulated from final output, the only balanced solution is one in which the capital-output ratio remains constant. Following this definition it is convenient to write the system in terms of the following stationary variables, where C denotes consumption, 1 σ is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution and β is the rate of time preference. The representative agent produces output, Y , combining private capital, , and public capital or infrastructures, , according to the following Cobb-Douglas technology:
2)
The producer faces decreasing returns to scale in the private factor, and constant returns to scale in both factors, as in Futagami et al. (1993) . Private capital, that depreciates at a rate, K δ , is accumulated out of income net of taxes, t τ , after allowing for consumption net of lump sum transfers, T . Therefore the law of motion of the private capital stock is, ( )
Thus we assume that the representative agent maximizes his utility function, (B.1), subject to the budget constraint, (B.3), and treating the stock of public capital, , as given and independent of his own decisions, reaching the familiar law of motion for consumption growth, The government sets its current expenditure on public capital, G , as a fraction of output, with a fixed component, , and a time varying component, , that is introduced to replicate the behavior illustrated in Figure 5 . Finally, we assume that the government balances the budget every period through a proportional tax on income, t g τ = .
As a result, the aggregate resource constraint can be written as, We define an equilibrium growth path as one along which, aggregate output, private capital, public infrastructure and consumption are growing at the same constant rate, so that the outputcapital ratio and the ratio of public to private capital remain constant. Since our objective is to analyze the behavior of the economy about this long-run equilibrium it is convenient to define the following variables, G z K K = and c C K = , that remain stationary along such a path. Rewriting our system in terms of these stationary variables we get the following set of dynamic equations, ( )
